The other day, I had briefly written on how Science that deals with the objects of nature - through the method of observation and measurement of "regularities" - cannot be allowed to transpose this method into Economics, because in The Market all data are in a permanent flux and there are neither regularities nor any "mathematical constants." There are only "variables."
I then briefly described the methodology of the Austrian school of economists, how their "subjective" focus made them look into the human mind and find regularities in "laws of thought."
Thus, the laws of demand and supply are laws of thinking common to us all - they are not our "responses to stimuli." Our actions are guided not by external events, but by our thinking.
The other day, I began a re-read of Ludwig von Mises' Theory and History and found that in the introduction itself, he makes this point extremely well:
...we do not know how external events—physical, chemical, and physiological—affect human thoughts, ideas, and judgments of value. This ignorance splits the realm of knowledge into two separate fields, the realm of external events, commonly called nature, and the realm of human thought and action.
Mises goes on to explain the difference between the science of human thought and action and that of physics and chemistry:
The sciences of human action start from the fact that man purposefully aims at ends he has chosen. It is precisely this that all brands of positivism, behaviorism, and panphysicalism want either to deny altogether or to pass over in silence. Now, it would simply be silly to deny the fact that man manifestly behaves as if he were really aiming at definite ends. Thus the denial of purposefulness in man's attitudes can be sustained only if one assumes that the choosing both of ends and of means is merely apparent and that human behavior is ultimately determined by physiological events which can be fully described in the terminology of physics and chemistry.
Mises goes on to describe the difference between objects of nature and Man
Epistemologically the distinctive mark of what we call nature is to be seen in the ascertainable and inevitable regularity in the concatenation and sequence of phenomena. On the other hand the distinctive mark of what we call the human sphere or history or, better, the realm of human action is the absence of such a universally prevailing regularity. Under identical conditions stones always react to the same stimuli in the same way; we can learn something about these regular patterns of reacting, and we can make use of this knowledge in directing our actions toward definite goals. Our classification of natural objects and our assigning names to these classes is an outcome of this cognition. A stone is a thing that reacts in a definite way. Men react to the same stimuli in different ways, and the same man at different instants of time may react in ways different from his previous or later conduct. It is impossible to group men into classes whose members always react in the same way.
[You can find a PDF of the book here.]
Thus, statistical measurements and mathematical "modeling" are inappropriate for the Science of Economics, which must rely on "discursive reasoning." Economics is a "logical science." You will not find a single mathematical equation, statistical chart or table, nor any graphs in any book by an Austrian economist.
A few years ago, I read somewhere that Mises used to tell his students to carefully study An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method by Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel. I got myself a copy. The last chapter is titled "Fallacies" and its third and last section is "Abuses of Scientific Method." In this section, under the sub-heading "The fallacy of Simplism or Pseudo-Simplicity" the authors have an interesting example of why "ideas" matter - or, rather, that the world of matter and the world of ideas are separate fields of inquiry:
Thus popular materialism thinks it is scientific in arguing there is nothing in the world but matter, because everything we can talk about intelligibly contains matter or reference to it. But obviously, erroneous views exist in this world, and the materialist cannot argue that errors are themselves material. Errors do not exert electric or gravitational influence. And if he argues that only matter has real existence, he has only given us an implicit definition of "real existence"; he has not effectively denied that there are other elements in this world besides matter.
What you see in all those charts and graphs and mathematical equations is not "science." They are all examples of "pseudo-simplicity." Hayek called this "scientism" - the imitation of the methods of science. But it is really worse than that. Because it seems simple to grasp, it conveys its errors more powerfully.
A great example of such a "pseudo-simple" textbook is the best-selling one by Paul Samuelson. It used to be in technicolour in my time, with charts, graphs and whatnot. It trained you to see the world in Keynesian complexities. Yet it was "simple."
Robert Higgs of The Independent Institute has written of the "dangers of Samuelson's Economic method" - and you can find this article here.
After long and thorough reasoning, Higgs concludes:
Seventeen years ago, Reason magazine invited a number of writers, including me, to contribute a brief entry for a feature called “Know Thy Enemy.” The idea was that each of us would “suggest a book published in the last 50 years that is significant because it has helped promote wrongheaded ideas with serious consequences” (1993, 32). For my contribution, I selected Samuelson’s Foundations. If I had to identify such a book today, I still could not think of a more apposite choice.
Incidentally, Paul Samuelson was the first American to win the Nobel prize in Economics, which he received for having "done more than any other contemporary economist to raise the level of scientific analysis in economic theory."
Indeed, errors have a material existence. And they cause havoc. Especially in the Science of Economics, which concerns human survival. Mainstream Economics is nothing but error - beginning with their epistemological foundations, their very method, their "theory of knowledge."
Friedrich Hayek wrote a slim book on the history of positivism titled The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Well worth a read. The "IIT-IIM mind" is the perfect example of the deliberate cultivation of such mindsets in socialist India - all in error. The "abuse of reason."
To understand the Austrian method in a few pages I suggest Hans-Hermann Hoppe's excellent introduction, which you can find here. Read the first chapter a few times. The second might just confuse you, so you can leave it for some other time.
From The CounterRevolution of Science Studies on the Abuse of Reason by F. A. Hayek
ReplyDeleteThe stress which we have laid on the fact that in the social sciences our data or "facts" are
themselves ideas or concepts must, of course, not be understood to mean that all the concepts with which we have to deal in the social sciences are of this character. There would be no room for any scientific work if this were so; and the social sciences no less than the natural sciences aim at revising the popular concepts which men have formed about the objects of their study, and at replacing them by more appropriate ones. The special difficulties of the social sciences, and muchconfusion about their character, derive precisely from . I ,IV'the fact that in them ideas appear in two capacities, as it were, as part of their object and as ideas about that object. While in the natural sciences the contrast be tween the object of our study and our explanation of it coincides with the distinction between ideas and objective facts, in the social sciences it is necessary to draw a distinction between those ideas which are constitutive of the phenomena we want to explain and the ideas which either we ourselves or the very people whose actions we have to explain may have formed about these phenomena and which are not the cause of,
but theories about, the social structures.
http://www.tim.ethz.ch/education/courses/courses_fs_2010/course_docsem_fs_2010/Literature/5_Hayek_The_counter-revolution_of_science_chap_4.pdf
On the topic of mathematics not being applicable to economics, besides reading your blog, I have also read a paper by Mises titled "Comments About the Mathematical Treatment of Economic Problems". In my brief reading thus far, the arguments in favor of this idea are less than convincing.
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that we already have difficulty modeling complex systems of interacting simpler subsystems, while the economy (which is really the entire human action) is a complex system of interacting complex subsystems.
Take weather forecasting, for example. We can model fluid or gas behavior in a simple (almost) isolated system, e.g. in the piston of an engine. But, when the size of the system is about the size of the entire planet, there are so many influences on it, e.g. solar radiation, other terrestrial phenomena such as volcanoes, and human activity etc. that we need super computers to model these systems to even a rudimentary level of accuracy. Meteorologists cannot tell you what the temperature will be a year from now. Yet, some advances have been made in weather prediction that based on certain measurements of the subsystems (measurement of precipitation in the lower atmosphere, and jet streams) we can predict weather better than chance a few days in advance, provided no unexpected and disruptive event happens, e.g. volcanic eruption. So, weather forecasting has some merits.
Economic systems are even more complex because of added layers of complexity. It is not only a complex system of interacting sub-systems, that is, humans (brains), the sub-systems themselves are complex systems of complex sub-subsystems, that is, neurons and molecules etc. So, it is very hard to predict individual human action and the course of economic systems. However, when I say “very hard”, I do not mean impossible, although it does seems near impossible today. Also, within limits, it does yield certain level of accuracy in certain predictions, because it is not impossible to conceive of certain statistical patterns of human action, especially when the influencing conditions are well studied. For example, in a “stable” economy with certain level of prosperity and well being, birth rates across years and states might be in a tight range, if not constant. This might be true, even if each individual couple has their own “free will” and complexities in life deciding when and how many babies to have. Also, in well known economic and cultural conditions one can predict to reasonable accuracy the number of new homes that will be sold in a given year. So, economic modeling is not without its merits either.
The problem comes when we demand too much from economic modeling while our models and even the set of sample observations used for deriving these models are not there yet. This includes predicting long range economic “forecasts”, because these do not capture people’s reactions to disruptive events (e.g. war, policy change, economic cycles etc.) or emergence of disruptive technologies or business models.
So, economic modeling is not entirely futile, but it has been stretched too far by people who ignore (because they are deluded) or hide (because they are trying to delude others) the current limits of economic modeling.
Thanks Amit.
ReplyDeleteFor my readers, the brief paper by Mises Amit refers to, titled "Comments About the Mathematical Treatment of Economic Problems" can be found here:
http://mises.org/journals/jls/1_2/1_2_2.pdf
It begins with the motto of the Econometrics Society: "Science is Measurement."
Do read the brief paper and think for yourself.
@amit. forgot to add. basically, i agree with your argument that many have been ignoring the limits of economic theory. My point is that even the current method is pointless. The benefits of economic modeling you talked about is essentially the work of statistics. We probably do not need economic theory for that.
ReplyDelete@Anoop Raj K: You need economic theory to interpret the numbers thrown up by statisticians. The statistics are mere "history" - they refer to events past. It is when the data is interpreted that different theories compete - for example, Krugman the Keynesian arguing for more "Fed stimulus," and Ron Paul the Austrian saying "End the Fed." Or take the case of population statistics, with Paul Ehrlich forecasting doom in his "Population Bomb" and Julian Simon, using the same figures to arrive at the opposite conclusion: that human beings are the "ultimate resource," and the more there are of us, the merrier.
ReplyDelete